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Process in -the Federal Courts:
State or Federal Jurisdictional Standards?
A recent Second Circuit opinion, Arrowsmith v. United
Press Int'l, continues a lively debate over the applica-
bility of the Erie doctrine to the in personam, jurisdiction
of federal courts sitting in diversity cases. The author of
this Note considers the effect of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and then examines, in the light of the
Supreme Court's decisions in York and Byrd, the federal
and state policies reflected in the choice of the jurisdic-
tional standards. He concludes that jurisdiction may, in
many circumstances, be an inappropriate area for the
application of state law.
Before a federal court in a diversity action can determine
whether it has in personam jurisdiction over a foreign corporate
defendant, -it often must first decide whether the standard that
governs its assertion of jurisdiction is a uniform federal standard
or the standard followed by the courts of the state in which the
federal court sits.' This choice between standards has recently
received consideration in Jennings v. McCall Corp.2 and Smartt
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Corp.3 ; and it was given nearly exhaustive
exposition in Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, in which the
Second Circuit, sitting en banc, overruled the alternate ground of
its earlier opinion in Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc." These
recent decisions, like the great majority that preceded them,0 all
1. In theory, of course, the federal courts will always apply a federal juris-
dictional standard. The question is whether the federal standard requires
reference to state law. See Kenny v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 838, 847
n.10 ($.D. Cal. 1955). In the discussion that follows this intermediate step will
be disregarded.
.2. 320 Fad 64 (8th Cir. 1963).
3. 318 Fad 447 (6th Cir. 1963).
4. 320 F.d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
5. 282 Fad 508 (2d Cir. 1960).
6. First Circuit: Waltham Precision Instrument Co. v. McDonnell Aircraft
Corp., 310 Faed 20 (1962); Pulson v. American Rolling ill Co., 170 Fed 19s
(1948); Third Circuit: Partin v. Michaels Art Bronze Co., 202 F2d 541 (1953);
Fourth Circuit: -Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Bunge Corp., 307 Fa2d 910
(1962); liff v. American Fire Apparatus Co., 277 Fad 360 (1960); Wcstcott-
Alexander, Inc. v. Dailey, 264 F.2d 853 (1959); Fifth Circuit: Connor v. Newv
York Times Co., 310 Fa2d 133 (1962); Stanga v. McCormick Shipping Corp.,
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chose the state standard, although the courts often failed to con-
sider the implications of their choice. Notwithstanding the con-
sensus on this subject, there remain compelling reasons for
continuing discussion of the problems involved: The Supreme
Court has never spoken clearly on the issue; views strongly in
favor of a federal standard have been expressed by numerous
commentators;7 and the prodigious reputation of the late Judge
Clark, author of Jaftex and a dissenter in Arrowamith, in matters
of federal jurisdiction and procedure demands that his argu-
ments be given respectful consideration. This Note discusses the
development of the choice between federal and state jurisdictional
standards in diversity cases and the policies and considerations
that should play a part in making the choice.8
Erie R.R. v. Tomppkins9 held that the Rules of Decision Act"0
requires a federal court in diversity actions1 to apply the sub-
stantive law of the state in which it sits as that law is declared in
the decisional, as well as the statutory, law of the state. Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York 2 declared that state procedural rules must also
be followed if they are "outcome-determinative" because "the
outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substan-
268 F.2d 544 (1959); Smith v. Ford Gum & Mach. Co., 212 F.2d 581 (1054);
Seventh Circuit: Edwin Raphael Co. v. Maharam Fabrics Corp., 283 F.2d
310 (1960); Roberts v. Evans Case Co., 218 F.2d 893 (1955); Canvas Fabrica-
tors, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 199 F.2d 485 (1952); Eighth Cir-
cuit: Ark-La Feed & Fertilizer Co. v. Marco Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 197 (1901);
Ninth Circuit: L. D. Reeder Contractors v. Higgins Indus., Inc., 205 F.2d
768 (1959) (semble); Tenth Circuit: Walker v. General Features Corp., 319
F.2d 583 (1963); Steinway v. Majestic Amusement Co., 179 F.2d 681 (1049);
District of Columbia Circuit: Mutual Intl Export Co. v. Napco Indus., Inc.,
316 F.2d 393 (1963).
7. 1A MooaE, FEDERAL PACTICE 0.317[5]; 2 id. 4.25; Hart, The Re-
lations Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLum. L. REV. 489 (1954); Hill,
The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U1L. REv. 427 (1958); Meador,
State Law and the Federal Judicial Power, 49 VA. L. REv. 1082 (1903); Note,
56 COLUm. L. Rnv. 894 (1956); Note, 5 DuKE BJ. 129 (1956); Note, 09 HARv.
L. REv. 508 (1956); 47 CoRNF LI L.Q. 280 (1962); 77 HARv. L. Rav. 559 (1904);
74 HARv. L. REv. 1662 (1961). Contra, ALI, STUDY or TIE DVrnsION or Juis-
DICTION BETWEEN STATE AI{D FEDERAL COURTS 24, 67-69 (tentative draft No. 2,
1963); 6 VILL. L. REv. 408 (1961).
8. See also Note, Federal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations and the
Erie Doctrine, 64 CoWum. L. Ray. 685 (1964).
9. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
10. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92 (now 28 US.C. § 1052
(1958)).
11. Erie, of course, is not limited to diversity actions.
12. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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tially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a
litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court."' 3 The well-
known result has been a host of cases in which federal courts have
had to choose between federal and state laws.
The problem of ascertaining the standard for determining in
personam jurisdiction over foreign corporations, long a perplex-
ing one within our federal structure,14 soon arose in the context
of the Erie case.'5 In the years between Erie and York the lower
federal courts tended to make the hasty assumption that because
jurisdiction was traditionally procedural, federal standards ap-
plied.'6 After York, however, more thoughtful consideration led
to a contrary result. Judge Goodrich, sitting with the First Cir-
cuit, stated in Pulso v. American Rolling Mill Co. 7 that deter-
mination of a federal court's jurisdiction over a foreign corpora-
tion in diversity cases involved two steps: "The first is a question
of state law: has the state provided for bringing the foreign
corporation into its courts under the circumstances of the case
presented?' 8 If not, the diversity action will be dismissed for
want of jurisdiction. If the answer is yes, the court must deter-
mine whether such assertion of jurisdiction by the state court
would violate federal due process. If the fourteenth amendment
prohibits the assertion of jurisdiction by the state, the federal
court will not hear the case.
Although the Pulson test gained a wide following, 9 it is not
entirely clear whether the decision was based on Erie and York,
neither of which were cited by Judge Goodrich, or whether the
court thought that the manner of service of process under Rule
4 (d) (7) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure determined which
jurisdictional standard was to be applied. State methods of serv-
13. Id. at 109.
14. For an excellent brief history of federal jurisdiction over corporations,
see Note, 69 HAnv. L. Rrzv. 508, 509-14 (1956).
15. Hedrick v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 28 F. Supp. 257 (S.D. Ohio 1939).
16. Ibid.; cf. Roark v. American Distilling Co., 97 F.2d 297 (8th Cir.
1938).
17. 170 F2d 193 (1st Cir. 1948).
18. Id. at 194.
19. E.g., Smartt v. Coca-Cola Bottling Corp., 318 Fad 447 (6th Cir. 1968);
Waltham Precision Instrument Co. v. McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 310 F-2d 20
(1st Cir. 1962); M11ff v. American Fire Apparatus Co., 277 F.d 360 (4th Cir.
1960); Partin v. Afichaels Art Bronze Co., 202 Fa2d 541 (3d Cir. 1953); Rosen-
thal v. Frankfort Distillers Corp., 193 F.d 137 (5th Cir. 1951) (removed
action).
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ice, as authorized by Rule 4(d)(7),20 and as used in Pulson, are
used frequently by litigants in the federal courts. Their typical
provisions for service upon designated state officials and the in-
creased incidence of "long arm" statutes for service upon non-
resident defendants provide a more extensive and flexible reach
than the authorized federal methods. In the great majority of
appellate decisions that have chosen between federal and state
jurisdictional standards, service had been made pursuant to Rule
4(d)(7),21 and in those cases the choice was overwhelmingly in
favor of the state standard, although the cases are unclear as to
whether state standards were used because of Rule 4(d)(7) or be-
cause of Erie.22
Some who otherwise favor the choice of a federal standard,
notably Judge Clark,23 have argued that Rule 4(d)(7) itself re-
quires the use of state jurisdictional standards completely inde-
pendent of Erie grounds and that the cases following Pulson,
therefore, are not relevant when service is made in a federal man-
ner.24 Others have taken the contrary view, 25 arguing that Rule
20. And, since the 1963 amendments, also under Rule 4(e). Rule 4(d)(7)
provides that -service may be made on a foreign corporation "in the manner
prescribed by the law of the state in which the district court is held for the
service of summons or other like process upon any such defendant in an
action brought in the courts of general jurisdiction of that state."
21. Walker v. General Features Corp., 319 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1963); Smartt
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Corp., 318 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1963); Connor v. New
York Times Co., 310 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1962); Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc.
v. Bunge Corp., 307 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1962); Waltham Precision Instrument
Co. v. McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 310 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1962); Iliff v. American
Fire Apparatus Co., 277 F.2d 360 (4th Cir. 1960); Stanga v. McCormick Ship-
ping Corp., 268 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1959); Smith v. Ford Gum & Mach. Co.,
212 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1954); Steinway v. Majestic Amusement Co., 179 F.2d
681 (10th Cir. 1949); Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193 (1st
Cir. 1948).
22. See Partin v. Michaels Art Bronze Co., 202 F.2d 541, 545 (3d Cir.
1953) (concurring opinion).
23. See, e.g., Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 242 (2d Cir.
1963); Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960).
24. Thus Judge Clark in Arrowsmith whittles a considerable body of pre-
cedent down to the only two appellate-level cases that clearly and consciously
apply state jurisdictional standards where service was federally adequate:
Partin v. Michaels Art Bronze Co., 202 F.2d 541 (3rd Cir. 1953) and Canvas
Fabricators, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 199 F.2d 485 (7th Cir.
1952). Jennings v. McCall Corp., 320 F.2d 64 (8th Cir. 1963), which also looked
to state standards in spite of service in a federal manner, was decided after
Arrawsmith. See Mutual Int'l Export Co. v. Napco Indus., Inc., 316 F.2d 393,
395 n.7, 397 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (concurring opinion).
25. Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 226 (2d Cir. 1963);
Note, 56 COLUM. L. Rav. 394, 400 n.38 (1956); Note, 5 DUKE B.J. 129, 131
(1956).
NOTE
4(d) (7) relates -only to .the mechanics of service and that if state
jurisdictional standards apply, they apply for reasons indepen-
dent of the-rule. In support they point to the word "manner" in
the rule itself and-to Rule 82,-8 which states that the federal rules
do not extend or limit the jurisdiction of the district courts.-"
The word "manner" in Rule 4(d)(7) is somewhat ambiguous.
Nevertheless, it seems fairly certain that the rule requires the
federal courts to observe more than the mere mechanics of state
service. For example, a litigant in a federal court could not use
the manner of service prescribed by a typical nonresident motorist
statute (service onoa state official plus registered letter to the non-
resident defendant) in an action completely unrelated to the use
of a motor vehicle. Whether "manner" goes so far as to require in
personam jurisdiction to be determined by state standards when
state service is otherwise appropriately used remains unclear.
Rule 4(e), which was broadened by the 1963 amendments to
the federal rules to include service pursuant to a state statute and
which now generally governs service outside the state, may be
helpful in, determining the meaning of "manner." This rule pro-
vides that service may "be made under the circumstances and in
the manner prescribed in the statute... ,.*" This language makes
explicit what was probably clear before the amendment when out
of state service pursuant to a state statute could only be made
under Rule 4(d) (7): that use of state modes of service of process
in obviously inappropriate situations is improper. It now also
seems clear that "under the circumstances" is meant to include all
those. circumstances that by state standards will make the indi-
vidual or.corporation amenable to service. But the absence of such
language in Rule 4(d) (7) may indicate that when service is made
within the -state in a state-prescribed manner, the federal courts
need not imply a state standard for in personam jurisdiction from
"manner" or be concerned with the appropriateness of the situa-
tion for use- of the state service, but only the mechanics of state
service. 9 Thus, it remains unclear whether Pulson and the other
4(d)(7) cases stand for the proposition that Erie and York de-
26. See Note, 67 YAin L.. 1094, 1105 (1958).
27. But see. Mssissippi Publishing Corp. v. Mlurphree, 326 U.S. 438, ,5
(1946): "the Advisory Committee ... has treated Rule 82 as referring to venue
and jurisdiction of the subject matter of the district courts...
28. Emphasis added.
29. Neither the Advisory Committee's notes nor recent comment by the
Committee's reporter, Kaplan, Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 1961-1963(I), 77 HAnv. L. R.v. 601 (1964), throw any light on the
matter. The phrase "under the circumstances" appeared in the original Rule
1135
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mand the choice of a state standard or whether the choice follows
from the rule.
The problem of choosing between state and federal jurisdic-
tional standards is most clearly presented when service is made on
a foreign corporation in the independent federal manner pre-
scribed by Rule 4(d) (8). Here, if courts look to state standards for
a determination of amenability to process, it must be because in
some way the choice is dictated by Erie and its progeny. Since the
Supreme Court has never decided this issue,80 the lower federal
courts have had to act without its specific direction; those courts
that have chosen the state standard have looked most often not
to Erie itself, which was concerned with the states' sphere of sub-
stantive law, but to York,"1 which was concerned more with as-
suring uniformity of outcome between state courts and federal
courts sitting in diversity actions. The York policy found expres-
sion in the jurisdictional area subsequent to York in Angel v.
Bullington 2 and Woods v. Interstate Realty Co." In Angel the
Supreme Court held that a North Carolina statute that precluded
recovery of certain deficiency judgments must be applied by the
4(e), which spoke only of service made out of the state "whenever a statute
of the United States or an order of court" provided; therefore, the inclusion
of the phrase in the amended rule and its omission in Rule 4(d)(7) may be
without significance.
30. In Riverbank Labs. v. Hardwood Prods. Corp., 850 U.S. 1003 (1950)
the Court, per curiam, reversed a Seventh Circuit decision that had dismissed
a suit in the federal district court for lack of jurisdiction under Illinois law.
The Court said only that it was "of the opinion that the District Court cor-
rectly found there was proper service upon the defendant in this case." The
opinion is too brief to be of any value. See Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc.,
982 F.2d 508, 513 (1960); Note, 67 YALE LJ. 1094, 1097-98 (1958). But 8ee
K. Shapiro, Inc., v. New York Cent. R.R., 152 F. Supp. 722 (Efl. Mich. 1957).
The recent decision in National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S.
311 (1964), is of interest 'here. In that case eight out of nine members of the
Court indicated that they felt federal standards defined who is an "agent
authorized 'by appointment" under Rule 4(d)(1). This could be read to mean
that federal standards are to define who is amenable to service under .the
federal rules; but it is more likely that the Court meant only that federal
standards will define what constitutes a sufficient principal-agent relationship
to insure proper notice to the principal when -the purported agent is served
with process according to the federal rules.
31. It has been suggested that -the Erie doctrine might 'better be known as
the York doctrine; for while Eric destroyed the structure of Swift v. Tyson,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), York "forms the cornerstone of the new doctrine
which has replaced Tyson." Kurland, Book Review, 67 HAnv. L. REV. 900, 007
(1954).
32. 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
33. 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
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federal courts in North Carolina, even though the North Carolina
Supreme Court had interpreted the statute as "procedural" and
the specific cause of action in Angel arose out of an out-of-state
transaction. In Woods a Mississippi statute that closed the door
of the state courts to non-qualifying foreign corporate plaintiffs
was applied in the federal courts in Mississippi. At least impliedly
thesetwo cases overruled 4 a pre-Erie line of cases, beginning with
Barrow S.. Co. v. Kane,3 which had declared that the jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts could not be affected by state statutes.
Although Angel and Woods are not directly in point - they are
not concerned with amenability 6 - they are relevant because,
like York, they are an extension of the Erie doctrine that Erie
itself perhaps did not require. Before Erie, the federal courts de-
termined their jurisdiction without reference to state law, and this
application of federal standards was made independently of the
mandate of Swift v. Tyson because the federal courts considered
jurisdiction to be procedural 7 Thus, by overruling Swift, Erie
did not require the federal courts to change their jurisdictional
standards. Indeed, the repeal of the Conformity Act, which had
required adherence to state modes of practice3 and the estab-
lishment of an independent procedural system for the federal
courts at almost the same time that Erie was decided should have
reinforced the courts' adherence to their own standards. But
Angel and Woods indicated otherwise. Nevertheless, although the
statutes in these cases purported to deal with jurisdiction, both
clearly reflected substantive policies of the state: in Angel a policy
in favor of a certain class of debtors; in Woods a policy penalizing
non-qualifying foreign corporations. Thus neither Angel nor
Woods requires the federal courts to look to state in personam
34. See Angel v. Bullington, 830 U.S. 183, 192 (1947).
35. 170 U.S. 100 (1898); accord, David Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile
Club of America, 225 U.S. 489 (1912); see Mechanical Appliance Co. v. Castle-
man, 215 U.S. 437 (1910).
36. Citation of US. CoxsT. art. TI, § 2 and 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958) (the
basic diversity provisions) by advocates of a separate federal standard like-
wise seems inappropriate. Compare Partin v. Michaels Art Bronze Co., 202
F.2d 541, 545 (3d Cir. 1953) (concurring opinion), iath Kenny v. Alaska Air-
lines, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 838, 843 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
37. Although the Conformity Act, 17 Stat. 197 (1872) required adherence
to the local modes of practice "as near as may be," the federal courts generally
held that this provision did not require them to give effect to state rules that
would affect federal jurisdiction. E.g., Mechanical Appliance Co. v. Castleman,
215 U.S. 437 (1910); Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 US. 100 (1898); see 69
RAnv. L. Itsv. 508, 521 (1956).
38. See note 37, supra.
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or subject matter jurisdictional standards unless the state stand-
ards embody a substantive policy.
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Co-op."0 lends some support to adop-
tion of a federal jurisdictional standard. In Byrd the Supreme
Court held that the question of an employee's status, for purposes
of determining whether the South Carolina Industrial Commission
had jurisdiction over a negligence action, was one of fact to be
determined in the federal court by a jury, even though a state
rule permitted the question to be determined by the trial judge.
The federal system is an independent system for administering justice
to litigants who properly invoke its jurisdiction. An essential charac-
teristic of that system is the manner in which, in civil common-law
actions, it distributes trial functions between judge and jury and, under
the influence - if not the command - of the Seventh Amendment, as-
signs the'decisions of disputed questions of fact to the jury .... The
policy of uniform enforcement of state-created rights and obligations...
cannot in every case exact compliance with a state rule -not bound
up with rights and obligations- which disrupts the federal system of
allocating functions between judge and jury.40
Byrd was the first explicit expression by the Court of possible
limitations on the outcome-determinative test.41 But Byrd is a
subtle case; the Court's retreat from York is carefully measured. 2
The Court began with an examination of the South Carolina rule
and found that it arose almost accidentally - that it was not "an
integral part of the special relationship created by [the Workmen's
Compensation Act]"43 and that it was not "bound up with the
definition of the rights and obligations of the parties."44 Thus
South Carolina's denial of a jury trial on this issue represented no
clearly articulated substantive policy; the rule was truly proce-
dural, "merely a form and mode of enforcing" a right?.4 Finding
the rule "procedural" did not quite end the matter, however, for
the outcome-determinative principle remained. The Court de-
cided that whether the outcome test should be applied depended
39. 356 U.S. 525 (1958); accord, Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963).
40. 356 U.S. at 537-88.
41. But cf. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1940).
42. The analysis of Byrd that follows is based on that in Hill, The Erie
Doctrine and the Constitution (pt. 2), 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 541, 601-07 (1958).
43. 356 U.S. at 536. The issue of the jurisdiction of the Industrial Com-
mission had previously only arisen when appeal was made from the Commis-
sion to the state courts, and the issue had then been settled by the court. In
Adam v. Davison-Paxon Co., 280 S.C. 532, 96 S.E.2d 566 (1957), the South
Carolina court simply extended this policy when the jurisdiction of the Indus-
trial Commission was asserted as a defense in an action begun in a state
trial court.
44. 356 U.S. at 536.
45. Ibid.
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upon a balancing of that test against federal policies, in this case
represented by Herron v. Southern Pac. Co.' 0 and the seventh
amendment.37
In spite of these careful limitations on its retreat from York,
the Byrd Court appears to have deliberately asserted that identity
of outcbme is not the only consideration. Although the action was
one of common-law negligence, the defense raised- that the suit
was properly under the jurisdiction of the state Industrial Com-
mission - was statutory; and it is doubtful that there is any-
thing in the seventh amendment that compels the federal courts
to submit this issue to the jury when state practice is to the con-
trary. Thus, Byrd does seem, to intimate that in diversity cases
federal courts are more than just another court of the state in
which they sit.
Several interesting circuit court decisions have interpreted
Bryd as having a wider application than judge-jury relationships.
In lovino v. Waterson48 the Second Circuit held that Federal Rule
25(a) permitted substitution of a nonresident administrator in a
diversity action although New York, the forum state, would not
have done so. York was considered inapplicable because it had
involved a clear statutory state policy and because, unlike the
instant case where the court could rely on Rule 25(a), in York
there was no clearly relevant federal legislation. In Monarch Ins.
Co. v.-Spach49 the Fifth Circuit held that a prior inconsistent
statement by an officer of the plaintiff corporation was admissible
under Rule 43(a) although a statute of Florida, the forum state,
would have excluded it. Again the court pointed to Byrd: the
existence of a federal rule justified deviation from state practice.
Before Byrd could be applied to justify the choice of a federal
jurisdictional standard, the federal courts had to ascertain the
existence of such a standard. Judge Friendly, dissenter to the
alternate ground of decision in Jaftex and author of the over-
46. 283 U.S. 91 (1931), a pre-Erie case in which the Supreme Court held
that neither the Conformity Act nor the Rules of Decision Act required a
federal trial court to follow a state constitutional rule that contributory negli-
gence in all cases should -be left to the jury.
47. 356 U.S. at 536-39. The Court noted that in the circumstances of
By/rd the choice of jury over trial judge might not have any significant effect
upon the outcome (and this may well be true in most cases in which the rule
dealt with is not "bound up with... rights and obligations"), but the analysis
was based on the assumption that the outcome might have been substantially
affected.
48. 274 F-2d 41 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 US. 949 (1960).
49. 281 F.d 401 (5th Cir. 1960); cf. Hope v. Hearst Consol. Publications,
Inc., 294 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 956 (1962).
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ruling opinion in Arrowsmith, argued that there was not and never
had been a federal jurisdictional standard. He conceded that
nothing in the Constitution prevented "Congress or its rule-
making delegate from authorizing a district court to assume juris-
diction over a foreign corporation in an ordinary diversity case
although the state court would not."5 Judge Friendly is most
certainly correct; if the Erie result is required by the Constitution,
it is because Congress and the federal courts cannot promulgate
substantive rules of law for those courts in diversity actions. 1
Jurisdiction, on the other hand, if not clearly procedural, is at
least in the "twilight zone between [substance and procedure] ...
"012where a rational classification could be made either way ....
Until Congress does clearly establish a federal jurisdictional stand-
ard, argued Judge Friendly, the federal courts must apply the
standards of the states in which they sit.
Judge Clark, in both Jaftex and Arrowsmith, argued that a
federal jurisdictional standard did exist."' Although the parts of
his opinion dealing with the source of the standard are difficult
and obscure, it appears that he purported to derive the standard
from sections 1391 (dealing with venue) 4 and 1693 (dealing with
process)50 of title 28, although admitting that neither by itself
provides for a standard. These provisions both originated in sec-
tion 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,56 and Judge Clark found
some significance in their conjunction. It has been suggested that
he was reading the "doing business" test of section 1391(c) into
50. Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 210, 22o (1903).
51. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1950);
Hill, The Erie Doctrin and the Constitution (pt. 1), 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 427
(1958).
52. Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (lst Cir. 1940).
53. His argument is -set out generally in Arrowsmlth, 320 F.2d at 238-3.
and Jaftex, 282 F.2d at 512.
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1958), the relevant subsection, provides: "A cor-
poration may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or
licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall
be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes."
55. By its terms the provision refers to capias. It provides: "Except
as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, no person shall be arrested in one
district for trial in another in any civil action in a district court." It is largely
superseded by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
56. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78-79, which provided that
"no person shall be arrested in one district for trial in another, in any civil
action before a circuit or district court. And no civil suit shall be brought
before either of said courts against an inhabitant of the United States, by any
original process in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or
in which he shall be found at the time of serving the writ...."
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section 1693F7 He may, in fact, have been doing the reverse, look-
ing to section 1391(c) as relating to process as well as venue by
virtue of the fact that the provisions were once joined."'
Whatever significance there may be in the original conjunction
of the process and venue statutes, it is difficult to ascertain how
these provisions, if they have relevance to amenability at all, pro-
vide any more than a ceiling upon the exercise of jurisdiction; the
terms of both sections restrict the federal courts. They indicate
when jurisdiction is not to be asserted and are silent as to when
it is to be asserted.-The problem remains one of tfinding an ainrma-
tive mandate, because the traditional base of jurisdiction, physical
power, 5 9 is inapplicable to the abstract corporate entity. Perhaps
Judge Clark is saying that absent statutory restrictions the juris-
diction of the federal district courts is nationwide, but since there
have been restrictions from the inception of the district courts, a
federal standard has been evolved with reference to these restric-
tions. Hfit were not for the restrictions, the federal courts could
take jurisdiction in any case and there would be no need to define
a federal standard.60
The venue provision, section 1391(c), which provides that a
corporation may be sued in any district in which it is "doing busi-
ness," may itself provide a standard. Section 1891(c) has led to
remarkable confusion among courts that refuse to distinguish
clearly between venue and jurisdiction,"' although arguably there
57. 77 H~nv. L. Rlv. 559, 560 (1964).
58. See his comment in Arrowamit& on the "error" of the majority opinion
in "saying that § 11 [of the Judiciary Act of 1789] has always been a venue
provision and nothing more." 820 F2d at 238. In either case, the citation of
§ 1891(c) is curiously unhistorical, for that provision was added in 1948, as
Judge Clark surely knew.
59. See McDonald v. M bee, 243 US. 90, 91 (1917).
60. In support of this, see Judge Clark's frequent comments in both Arrow-
smith and Jaftex on the "well-known" requirement of service within the dis-
trict, and other -similar -language emphasizing restrictions. 820 F.2d at 38-39;
282 Fad at 512. It is, of course, commonplace that judicial development of
jurisdictional standards, in whatever context, comes most particularly where
the outermost limits of jurisdiction are tested.
For a view similar to Judge Clark's, finding a quasi-statutory basis for
federal jurisdiction, see Mutual Int'l Export Co. v. Napeo Indus., Inc., 316
F.d 893, 895-96 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (Wright, J., concurring): "[F]ederal law
has devised its own scheme of venue, convenience, and notice. Resort to local
law, therefore, except perhaps for implementation under Rule 4(d)(7), is
unnecessary and inappropriate."
61. E.g., Riverbank Labs. v. Hardwood Prods. Corp., 220 F.2d 465 (7th
Cir. 1955), rev'd, 350 US. 1003 (1956); cf. Satterfield v. Lehigh Valley RJt.,
128 F. Supp. 669 (S.D. N.Y. 1955).
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is no need to distinguish if the statute was meant to incorporate
a jurisdictional standard . 2 Judge Clark, while admitting that sec-
tion 1391 is a venue statute, agrees that "doing business" for
venue purposes is also applicable to define the requirements of
service of process.0 In any case, the test of doing business for
section 1891(c) purposes must be a federal test and resort to state
jurisdictional standards means "a developing confusion resulting
from a uniform federal interpretation of 'doing business' for pur-
poses of venue existing alongside fifty varying interpretations of
what is sufficient doing business to permit service of process. 0 4
Another possible source of a federal standard lies in Rule 4 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The decisions in both Iovino
and Spach were based on federal rules; the propriety of looking
to the federal rules for federal standards and policies was tacitly
noted by the Supreme Court in Byrd when it cited 5 with approval
Sibbach v. Wilson,"' which upheld Federal Rule 35 over a con-
trary state rule, although the federal policy in Byrd itself was
constitutionally derived. But the difficulty in looking for a federal
jurisdictional standard in Rule 4 is the same as trying to find it in
the venue and process statutes; the rule is not concerned with
amenability. All of these federal provisions - Rule 4, the venue
statute, and the process statute - are relevant only because they
express a legislative purpose to regulate and define the procedure
of the federal courts in areas very closely related to the problem
of amenability. The provisions lend support to Judge Clark's as-
sertion that the in personam jurisdiction of the courts "is to be
considered so much a part of the make-up of a federal court that
it is not lightly to be superseded, 0 7 but they do not by themselves
define a federal standard.
Even if a federal standard cannot be found in existing statutes,
62. Note, 56 COLuIm. L. REv. 394, 397-98 (1956); see Satterfield v. Lehigh
Valley R.R., 128 F. Supp. 669 (S.D. N.Y. 1955).
This may be true when there has been continuous activity by a corpora-
tion, see Note, 69 llAnv. L. REv. 508, 519 (1956), but it is doubtful if federal
venue is proper where a single act is involved, cf. Olberding v. Illinois Cent.
R.R., 346 U.S. 338 (1953), even though jurisdiction is clearly acquired thereby,
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). Under a recent amendment, venue is
now proper for tort actions relating to automobiles in the district where the
tort occurred. 77 Stat. 473 (1963).
63. Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508, 512 n.2 (2d Cir. 1960).
64. Barrett, Venue and Service of Process in the Federal Courts - Sug-
gestions for Reform, 7 VAunw. L. REv. 608, 618 (1954).
65. 356 U.S. at 538 n.12.
66. 312 U.S. 1 (1940).
67. Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508, 512 (2d Cir. 1900).
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it-seems fairly certain thatbefore Erie the federal courts had de-
veloped their own jurisdictional test0 If this test has survived
Erie and York and is applicable in diversity cases, the problem of
its present definition remains. Although Judge Clark denied that
the fourteenth amendment was his standard"9 and although the
Supreme Court has suggested that there are no constitutional
limits on federal in personam jurisdiction," because of the nature
of the federal judicial system - historically territorially limited -
the standard promulgated in International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton may be helpful 7
The traditional restrictions upon the federal courts have always
been in keeping with the territorial nature of the courts. Prior
to Erie and International Shoe the federal courts required corpo-
rate "presence" within the judicial district-2 Although Hutchin-
son ,v. Chase & Gilbert, Ino." and International Shoe broke down
the "presence" test to one of "reasonable contacts," the emphasis
68. James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry, 273 U.. 119 (1 27);
Bank of America v. Whitney Cent. Nat'l Bank, 261 US. 171 (1923); Rosen-
berg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.. 516 (1923); Philadelphia &
Reading Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917); Mechanical Appliance Co. v.
Castleman, 215 U.S. 487 (1910). But see Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320
U.S. 219, 228 (1963).
69. Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 238 (2d Cir. 1903).
70. See Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.. 438, 442 (1946)
(dictum) ("Congress could provide for service of process anywhere in the
United States"). So, for that matter, can any state. See, e.g., ILm. REV. STAT.
ch. 110, § 16 (1963). The statement speaks only to service. It says nothing
about amenability.
71. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Those who favor use of the state standard would,
of course, agree that International Siwe is the test in federal courts sitting in
states that have extended jurisdiction to the maximum permissible extent.
What is referred to here, however, are courts which have looked to lntcrna-
tiona Shoe -because they feel it defines a federal standard, not because they
are applying a state standard.
On its facts, Internationl Shoe has, of course, no relevance for the federal
courts, for the case involved due process limitations of the fourteenth amend-
ment on the reach of state jurisdiction. A number of federal courts, however,
believe that the jurisdictional standard for federal courts is the one set out in
Inte national Shoe. E.g., Mutual Int'l Export Co. v. Napco Indus., Inc., 316
F.2d 393, 395 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (concurring opinion); Lone Star Package Car
Co. v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 212 F.2d 147, 155 (5th Cir. 1954); Southern New
England Distrib. Corp. v. Berkeley Fin. Corp., 30 F-U). 43 (D. Conn. 1962);
K. Shapiro, Inc. v. New York Cent. R.R., 152 F. Supp. 722 (E D. Mich. 1957);
see Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 345 U.S. 663, 666 (1953) (dictum);
Woodworkers Tool Works v. Byrne, 191 F.2d 667, 672 (9th Cir. 1951); French
v. Gibbs Corp., 189 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1951).
72. Philadelphia & Reading Ry v. McKibbin, 243 US. 264 (1917).
73. 45 FRd 139 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand, J.).
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remained on reasonable contacts with the forum. And until the
adoption of the 100-mile "bulge" in the 1963 amendments to the
federal rules,74 the process of district courts remained limited by
state lines, unless state procedures under Rule 4(d)(7) were used
or one of several special federal statutes, such as interpleader,7
was involved. Thus in a sense the federal courts have remained
local courts, and a jurisdictional standard such as International
Shoe evolved for the territorially limited jurisdiction of the states,
is not without relevance for the federal courts.70 The International
Shoe tests for determining the "presence" of an abstract entity,
the corporation, within a locality have applicability to any court,
including federal, with a territorially limited jurisdiction, 77 al-
though the test would not literally be a constitutional limit on the
federal courts.7s
Thus, although it is difficult to agree with Judge Clark when
he states that it is "quite clear and subject to dogmatic assertion
that there is a federal law of statutory authority," ' it should be
apparent that there is available precedent from which an inde-
pendent federal jurisdictional standard may be defined. As a
pragmatic matter, a satisfactory definition would have to take
74. FED. R. Crv. P. 4(f), which provides that "persons who are brought in
as parties pursuant to Rule 18(h) or Rule 14, or as additional parties to a
pending action pursuant to Rule 19, may be served in the manner stated in
paragraphs (1)-(6) of subdivision (d) of this rule at all places outside the state
but within the United States that are not more than 100 miles from the place
in which the action is commenced.... ." The question then arises as to what
standard shall govern amenability to service within the 100-mile area. The
Advisory Committee's reporter suggests what appears to be a fourteenth
amendment test: "the party should -be amenable to the federal process if,
considering its activities within the forum state plus the 100-mile area, it would
be amenable to that state's process, had the state embraced this area and
exerted judicial jurisdiction over the party to the degree constitutionally
allowable." Kaplan, supra note 29, at 633 (1964). He adds a caveat to this,
however: "This formula of amenability to federal process served within the
100-mile area may need correction in the degree that the constitutional stand-
ard for determining the state's judicial jurisdiction is thought to reflect 'terri-
torial' considerations as distinguished from considerations of fairness to the
defendant." Id. at 633 n.136.
75. 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1958).
76. Thus it seems unnecessary to question, as does Kaplan, see note 74
upra, application of fourteenth amendment standards to the federal courts -
at least in diversity cases -insofar as those standards reflect "territorial con-
siderations." See Hanson v. Denckla, 857 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
77. See Note, 69 HARv. L. REv. 508, 516-17 (1956).
78. But cf. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 331
(1964) (dissenting opinion).
79. Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 239 (1903).
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account of the territorial nature of the federal courts and would
probably be similar to the standard of International Shoe.
The mere existence of a federal jurisdictional standard does
not, however, mean that the standard is automatically applicable
to the federal courts in diversity cases. Byrd indicated that federal
courts must first ascertain whether the state rule is merely a
"form and mode" of enforcing the substantive right or whether
it is an integral part of the state-created right. Arguably a deter-
mination that the state rule is "substantive"80 would end the
matter, the federal courts being bound to apply the state rule.
Yet Byrd suggests that even if the state rule is "substantive," a
strong countervailing federal policy might prevail.81 If, however,
the federal courts find the state rule to be "procedural," the
policy underlying the outcome-determinative test must be bal-
anced against the policy underlying the federal standard.
Before Erie, with different rules of substantive law being ap-
plied in the state and federal courts within the same territorial
boundaries, parties who met the diversity requirements8 could
choose their forum on the basis of which court offered the most
favorable law. This "forum shopping" resulted in a large measure
of uncertainty in "everyday, prelitigation life."'sa Both Erie and
York aimed at eliminating this fortuity from the American federal
systemP4 In the nearly twenty years since York, the Supreme
Court has emphasized reaching outcomes similar to those reached
by the courts of the states in which they sit.ss The Court in York
could have gone only one step farther than Erie and recognized
80. A determination that a rule is "substantive" under Byrd is not the
same as "substantive" under Erie. Rather, it refers to the proximity of the
state rule to the state-created right. See Hill, supra note 40, at 604.
81. Id. at 606.
82. See Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab
& Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928), where a Kentucky corporation rencorpo-
rated in Tennessee in order to obtain diversity and reach a federal court.
83. Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLum. L.
Rnv. 489, 508 (1954).
84. In any case where jurisdiction is in issue the parties will almost cer-
tainly be diverse. If the jurisdictional amount can 'be satisfied, a federal forum
will generally be available. Thus, at least part of the objection to separate
federal law which leads to forum-shopping is not present here: there is no
advantage given to out of staters. Hence, the forum-shopping as such that may
result from a separate federal standard is not an evil; the clash with state
policy may be.
85. See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 US. 541 (1949);
Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949); Ragan v. Merchants
Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 US. 580 (1949); Angel v. Bullington, 330 US.
183 (1947).
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that rules purportedly procedural often embody substantive
policy judgments.8 6 But if the outcome test is applied to the
problem of in personam jurisdiction, it becomes clear that, what-
ever the Court was trying to do in York, by promulgating the
outcome test it did more than obligate the federal courts to apply
only those state procedural rules founded upon substantive
policies.
In personam jurisdiction unquestionably can be outcome-
determinative. No plaintiff can win his case unless he is able to
bring the defendant before the court. But jurisdiction is outcome-
determinative in a unique way. The nature of the typical case in
which choice of jurisdictional standard becomes an issue, as a
practical matter, will arise only when defendant's contact with
the forum has been minimal. Thus, there will almost always be
another state in which the plaintiff can enforce his rights. If York
only requires a federal court to follow procedural rules embody-
ing state substantive policy, then the federal court in the first
forum could take jurisdiction unless there was a substantive
policy - more than a form or mode of enforcing a right - behind
the denial of jurisdiction by the state in which it was sitting. But
a rigid application of the outcome test requires total uniformity
among all courts within the state and prevents the federal court
from asserting jurisdiction when in fact there may be no good
reason for doing so.
Byrd, therefore, may have a significant impact on the choice
of jurisdictional standards. Under Byrd, the court must first ascer-
tain whether the state's denial of jurisdiction is based on "sub-
stantive" considerations or is merely a "form and mode" of
enforcing the state-created right. If the state rule does not reflect
any substantive policy, the court must them balance the federal
standard against the policies underlying the outcome-determinative
test. But when another forum is available to enforce the right, use
of the outcome test is inappropriate, and the Byrd rationale would
indicate that a federal standard might properly be applied.
When, as is so often the case, the state denies jurisdiction
merely because it has not yet taken advantage of the widened
jurisdictional limits that followed from International Shoe or when
86. This certainly was what the Court was doing 'before York when it de-
cided that contributory negligence, Palmer v. Hoffiman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943),
conflict of laws, Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 813 U.S. 487
(1941), and burden of proof and presumptions, Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dun-
lap, 308 U.S. 208 (1939), were all to 'be determined by recourse to state law.
The same is true of the statute of limitations problem decided in York itself.
See Note, 5 Duxa B.J. 129, 135 n.24 (1956).
the denial is based solely on considerations of judicial administra-
tion, assertion of jurisdiction by the federal courts will not frus-
trate any state rights or policies.
A uniform federal jurisdiction standard is, in fact, a desirable
goal for the federal courts. Like any court in any case involving
contacts outside the forum, the federal courts, simply as a matter
of convenience, ought to be able to use their own procedure, and
this seems particularly true in so basic a matter as jurisdiction. 7
Furthermore, to repeat what the Supreme Court said in Byrd:
"The federal system is an independent system for administering
justice to litigants who properly invoke its jurisdiction.!" s Thus,
the federal courts should apply their own jurisdictional standard,
unless compelling reasons to the contrary can be found rooted in
the substantive policies of the forum state. Since York the federal
courts have tended too often to lose sight of their independent
role and to attempt a slavish adherence to state policies. Byrd
announced the awareness of a countervailing federal policy.
An independent federal jurisdictional standard would mean,
of course, geographically broadening corporate amenability to
suit. Any unfairness and inconvenience to the corporate defendant,
insofar as they are not eliminated by the jurisdictional standard
itself, should be prevented by the venue provision of section 1391
and the transfer provision of section 1404 of title 28. Compensat-
ing for whatever disadvantages broadening of amenability to suit
may entail for corporations, there is a gain in certainty and uni-
formity for corporations engaged in multistate business. The
forum-shopping that results from a separate federal standardm
87. There are, however, certain arguments against the desirability of a
federal standard. They are premised on the idea that protection of nonresi-
dents against local bias, Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 US. (5 Cranch)
61 (1809), is the traditional reason for diversity jurisdiction. In the typical
diversity case where jurisdiction is an issue-suit -by a resident plaintiff
against a foreign defendant-this policy is not present at all. Indeed, resort
to -the federal.courts by resident plaintiffs would be abolished by the proposed
amendments to the judicial code. See ALI, STuDy oF TE Divisio op Juat-
DIcTION BmFEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 22-24, 62-67 (tentative draft
No. 2, 1963). If the defendant is concerned about local bias he can remove to
the federal court. In the classic diversity case -nonresident plaintiff versus
resident defendant -jurisdiction is not likely to be an issue. See Arrowsmith v.
United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 226-27 (1960). There remains, of course, suits
by nonresidents against other nonresidents, where use of a state jurisdictional
standard seems particularly inappropriate.
88. 356 U.S. at 537.
89. Arguably, a -broader federal standard may lead to interstate forum-
shopping insofar as service would be made available in states previously
closed. 77 HARv. L. REv. 559, 561 (1964). Thus in Arroawmitdi suit was brought
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should in this instance be a factor favoring uniformity - a nation-
wide uniformity of amenability. Further, the establishment of a
uniform standard is a legitimate desideratum 0 for the federal
courts, both from the viewpoint of stabilizing their own proce-
dure, and because the federal courts, as arms of the national govern-
ment have traditionally played a role in unifying the country.
in Vermont by a Maryland resident against United Press International, a
nationwide press service, on an alleged defamation originating in Georgia.
Vermont was obviously chosen because of its longer statute of limitations.
There are three factors that should minimize this problem: 1) Interstate
forum-shopping is always possible in a country made up of sovereign states.
A -separate federal jurisdictional standard increases this possibility only to
the degree that the federal standard is more liberal than the state. 2) Libel, as
involved in Arrowsmith, is a peculiar sort of cause of action. Its situs is diffi-
cult to define. For a special treatment of defamation, see N.Y. Civ. PAc. L.
& R. 1 02 (a)(2). For more conventional and localized causes of action corpo-
rate defendants will be able to make use of the transfer statute, 28 U.S.C.
1404 (1958), on the ground of forum non conveniens, if they are -hauled into
inappropriate forums. 8) The possibility of widened liability that may follow
establishment of a -separate federal jurisdictional standard should be in part
attributed to improper choice of law rules. Thus, although application of
Vermont statutes of limitations in Arrowsmith may ,be proper, application of
the forum's -statute of limitations in an action 'between nonresidents that
arose out of the state is inappropriate. It is particularly inappropriate in a
federal court. See the dissent ,by Justice Jackson in Wells v. Simonds Abrasive
Co., 845 U.S. 514, 519 (1953), and his concurring opinion in First Nat'l Bank
v. United Airlines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396, 398 (1952). See also Hill, The Eric
Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 427 (1958).
90. This is particularly true in multiparty suits, as already indicated by
"the thrust of the federal rules toward resolution in an integrated proceeding
of all claims arising out of a single controversy." 77 HARv. L. REv. 559, 501
(1964). See ALI, Sn'rmy OF r=n DivisIoo OF JURISDIcTIoN BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS 34-45, 149-57 (tentative draft No. 2, 1963).
